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TimeBiopolitics and Temporality in
Arendt and Foucault
Kathrin Braun
ABSTRACT. The article demonstrates that Hannah Arendt’s
examination of modern temporality strongly intersects with Michel
Foucault’s diagnosis of modern biopolitics. Both observe three key
features of biopolitical modernity: the political zoefication of life, a
technocratic understanding of politics, and processual temporality
which link the project of modernity to the project of 20th-century
totalitarianism. Arendt, however, also offers an alternative, non-
biopolitical understanding of politics, life, and time captured in the
concept of natality. Built into the concept of natality is the ‘weakly’
messianic temporal structure of the interval as opposed to processual
temporality. KEY WORDS • Arendt • biopolitics • Foucault • 
messianic time • modernity • natality • temporalitygh Hannah Arendt never used the term ‘biopolitics’, she has developed
f the most critical insights into the primacy of life in modern society and
uction of people to mere living things in 20th-century totalitarianism.
insights, I will argue, essentially refer to a fatal modern structure of 
ality, which I will term processual temporality, that runs from the begin-
f modernity through 20th-century totalitarianism up to post-war capital-
s society. I will show that Arendt’s examination of modern temporality to
egrees overlaps with Michel Foucault’s diagnosis of modern biopolitics
t Arendt, unlike Foucault, also offers a starting point for developing a 
t, non-biopolitical conception of politics, based on a different, non-
ual form of temporality: the temporality of the interval.
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Recent work in philosophy and the social sciences has highlighted a number
of intersections and affinities between Foucault and Arendt, although they never
referred to one another (Allen, 2002; Gordon, 2002). Both reject an essentialist
conception of human nature and a teleological conception of history, be it of
Hegelian or Marxist provenance, and both share a commitment, although
spelled out differently, to a type of inquiry that combines philosophical and 
historical perspectives. It would not be too far-fetched to say that not only
Foucault but also Arendt reconstructed the ‘history of the present’, to use
Foucault’s term. Both investigate the ideational dimension of history without
reducing it, however, to a traditional history of ideas. While in Foucault it is the
body that is of particular importance to his history of the present, in Arendt it is
the category of experience, as we will see later on. It has also been noted that
both Arendt and Foucault move beyond a Weberian notion of power (Allen,
2002; Gordon, 2002), both stressing the relational and performative, and, as I
would add, the generative character of power. However, one must not take the
analogy too far because, as Richard Dana Villa (1992) remarks, when Foucault
and Arendt speak about power, they speak about different things. While the
Foucauldian concept of power in a specifically crypto-normative way denotes a
ubiquitous, pervasive, and somewhat dark and troubling force, power in Arendt
(1970) emanates from concerted political action. It is neither dark nor troubling
but, as we will see, the public and visible manifestation of human action’s
‘weak’ messianic potency, making its appearance in a specifically messianic
structure of temporality: the interval.
It was Giorgio Agamben, however, who most influentially highlighted the
aspect of biopolitics in Arendt and Foucault, bringing together the Foucauldian
concept of biopolitics with Arendt’s analysis of totalitarianism. In his Homo
Sacer, Agamben (1998), who makes detailed reference to Arendt’s analysis of
how totalitarianism reduces persons to mere specimens, deplores the fact that
Arendt did not explicitly draw a connection between her analysis of modern
society in The Human Condition (1958) and her analysis of totalitarianism in
Origins (1968). He concludes that Origins was altogether without a biopolitical
perspective (Agamben, 1998) whereas Foucault, Agamben says, has never dealt
with 20th-century totalitarianism. Both statements, however, are only partly 
correct. Foucault, in the last part of The History of Sexuality (1980) and in his
lectures at the Collège de France in 1976 (Foucault, 2003), albeit briefly, did
refer to totalitarianism, and these passages, as Alan Milchman and Alan
Rosenberg (1998) have shown, are perfectly in line with his other works. As far
as Arendt is concerned, it is correct that in Origins she does not refer to the terms
‘life’ or ‘biopolitics’ and does not explicitly explain the relation between The
Human Condition and Origins. However, in The Human Condition, she inten-
sively examines the notion of life in connection with the emergence of the social
and the decline of politics in occidental history up to the 20th century. Agamben,
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strangely enough, makes little or no use of these thoughts. In this essay, I will
not undertake a detailed discussion of Agamben’s political theory but rather
continue the project of bringing Arendt and Foucault together on the issue of
biopolitics. Although the term ‘biopolitics’ does not appear in Arendt, I will
argue that in her work we can find a rich and in-depth analysis of the specific
features that constitute modern biopolitics, so that we can read Arendt as a 
theorist of biopolitics avant la lèttre. So far, this aspect in Arendt’s work seems
to have been widely overlooked. An exception is André Duarte (2005) who
argues that reading Origins and The Human Condition as analyses of biopoliti-
cal violence, even though biopolitics is not an Arendtian category, enables us to
find the missing link between these two works and to understand the lingering
continuity between capitalist market society and totalitarian violence in our con-
temporary world. Duarte suggests that we live in a world in which there is a con-
stant danger that the Arendtian animal laborans gets converted into the
Agambian homo sacer. My own reading of Arendt widely corresponds to this
thesis, but I will discuss in more detail the overlaps and intersections between
Foucault’s conception of biopolitics and Arendt’s analysis of totalitarianism.
These intersections, I argue, concern the analysis of certain critical features of
the modern project that culminate and converge in totalitarianism: the zoefica-
tion of humans, a technocratic understanding of politics, and, not least, pro-
cessual temporality. The issue of temporality, as I will show, is of particular 
significance in Arendt’s political thought. Furthermore, I will focus on Arendt’s
specific contribution to a theory of biopolitics and modernity and point out the
additional insights she can offer. Those consist, in my view, first in opening up
an additional dimension of understanding in regard to biopolitics, one that refers
to a debatable but also inspiring existentialist, if not theological, layer in her
thought. Second, and linked to this dimension, with her concept of natality, she
presents an alternative way of conceiving temporality, politics, and life that has
the potential to take us beyond the spell of biopolitics.
Both Arendt and Foucault belong to those thinkers who draw our attention to
the dark sides of the modern project. Arguably, what Jeffrey Isaac (1996) said
about the work of Arendt is equally true for Foucault: both are puzzled by the
irony ‘that the modern age, which proclaims the value of life above all else, is
also the age of genocidal mass murder’ (p. 65). That is, both Arendt and
Foucault ask the question of how the atrocities of 20th-century totalitarianism
were rooted in the soil of modernity and how to unearth these roots. Whereas
Arendt provides an in-depth study on the functioning principles of totalitarian
rule and the nexus between shaping, regulating, and enhancing the Volkskörper
and classifying and killing people marked as ‘life not worth living’, Foucault’s
works, as Milchman and Rosenberg (1998) point out, rather shed light on the
formative stages of this nexus. Milchman and Rosenberg argue that the idea 
of ‘life not worth living’ can be seen as one possible, though not necessary, 
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outcome of the practices of classifying and categorizing in terms of health–
disease, normal–pathological, fit–unfit, which Foucault traced back to the emer-
gence of modern medicine, psychiatry, biology and the carceral society. In the
following, I will highlight some further aspects in the works of Foucault and
Arendt that illuminate the threads running from the formation of the modern
project to the extermination camps. To avoid misunderstandings, this is not to
say that Nazism was the inevitable, necessary outcome of anything. It is only to
say that Nazism was able to build on ideational and practical elements that were
and still are key to modernity and that it is worthwhile studying these elements
in order to be aware of the possibility that they might again grow into a real
nightmare.
The first aspect I want to highlight is the observation of what might be termed
the political zoefication of humans.1 Looking at the formative stage of the
modern state, Foucault (1980) observes that it was accompanied or even charac-
terized by the move through which humans as living beings became the subject
and target of political rule: ‘Power would no longer be dealing simply with legal
subjects over whom the ultimate domination was death, but with living beings,
and the mastery it would be able to exercise over them would have to be applied
at the level of life itself; it was the taking charge of life, more than the threat of
death, that gave power its access event to the body’ (pp. 142–3). The life at stake
here is clearly not the life people live, not the life story, the biography, but rather
the zoe-aspect of their existence. Public policy and the welfare state through 
the late 18th and 19th centuries, Foucault argues, co-emerged with practices,
institutions, and new bodies of knowledge, designed to take care of the physical
aspects of human life such as fertility, health, disease, longevity, or morbidity,
in order to enhance the productivity of the population as well as its loyalty to 
the state (Foucault 1988). Foucault (2000) makes it clear that the shift towards
‘the population’ was a decisive precondition for the emergence of the economy
as a separate sphere which he links to the ‘governmentalization of the state’ 
(p. 220), that is, the understanding of politics as government in the sense of 
management.
This analysis partly overlaps with Arendt’s indictment in The Human
Condition (1958) that modern society is being based on labour rather than on
work or political action. Labour, in her terminology, means the type of activity
that serves the necessities of life and the ongoing circle of consumption and
reproduction. The purpose of labour is not really to produce lasting works but to
maintain the life processes of the individual, society, and the species. The
Arendtian categories of labour, work, and action are certainly problematic, as
Bronislaw Szerszynski (2005) argues, particularly when understood as univer-
sal, neatly separable features of human existence or as an account of the social
evolution. Still, I think, if we do not share Arendt’s ‘phenomenological essen-
tialism’ (Benhabib, 1996: 123–41) but rather understand ‘labour’, ‘work’ and
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‘action’ as a typology of action within modern society, these concepts may be
useful to understand some of its basic features.
From this perspective, Arendt’s delineation of the role of labour as compared
with work and action clearly draws from Marx’s analysis of capitalist accumu-
lation (Braun, 2001); human activity merely serves as a means to feed the ongo-
ing dynamic of a process that Marx has analysed as the process of capitalist
accumulation. Any act of work tends to get transformed into an act of labour
insofar as it is neither performed for its own sake nor for the sake of creating a
lasting product but merely as a means to maintain the dynamic of the economy.
Arendt (1958) here speaks of ‘repetition and the endlessness of the process
itself’ and of a ‘specifically modern acceleration’, which has transformed work
into labour (p. 125). It is not least in this sense that life in modern society has
become the highest good; however, it is not the life of human individuals but
rather the ‘life’ of society, the ongoing dynamic of the economic process, which
ranks as the supreme good.
Thus, while Foucault stresses that life is a resource which gets mobilized,
Arendt points out that life is constantly (re)produced. Both, however, state that
individual life functions as a force that feeds into the dynamic of a larger
process, be it as a resource or as a product, and that the newly emerging sphere
of the social is not least characterized by the constant consumption of life in
order to maintain the dynamic of this process. They both, I argue, make the 
diagnosis, which is actually very similar to the Marxian analysis of capitalist
society, that the rise of the social implies a certain degradation of individual
lives to mere means of sustaining and feeding the economy. Thus, to a certain
extent, we can say that the political zoefication of humans is inherent in modern
society from the very beginning.
The totalitarian systems of the 20th century, however, have taken the political
zoefication of humans to the extreme in reducing certain groups of people to the
status of being mere life. They did so through stripping these people of their civil
rights, social positions and political status. The concentration camps, Arendt
(1968) says, demonstrated ‘that human beings can be transformed into speci-
mens of the human animal’ (p. 455). She also makes clear, however, that the
practice of stripping people of their legal and political status was not invented by
the Nazis. It had already occurred in the aftermath of the First World War, when
hundreds of thousands of people became refugees, homeless or stateless due to
expatriation, flight, or expulsion. These people, Arendt says, belonged ‘to the
human race in much the same way as animals belong to a specific animal
species’ (p. 302); they were reduced to a status similar to that of an animal; it did
not matter what they thought or did but only what they were (Arendt, 1981).
While it was the Nazi state that declared whole categories of people to be ‘life
not worth living’ and accordingly destroyed their lives, the Stalinist Soviet
Union also, as both Arendt and Foucault remark, classified political adversaries
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in biological terms, as mentally ill (Foucault, 2003) or ‘dying classes or parasitic
races’ (Arendt, 1996: 938).2
The political zoefication of humans is closely linked to another thread which,
according to both Arendt and Foucault, runs through modern politics and 
society up to totalitarianism: the conception of politics as administration, 
namely the administration of life. Foucault (2003) shows that the emergence of
biopolitics comes with a shift from understanding politics basically as the con-
tinuation of war to an understanding of politics as administrating, regulating,
calculating, and managing the life of the population. Within this new paradigm
the population was seen as a resource that can be mobilized in order to 
strengthen the state. Administrating and managing this resource was dependent
on knowledge and gave rise to population statistics, population science, hygiene,
public health, or eugenics. These bodies of knowledge were, as Foucault points
out, intrinsically based on a logic of classifying, qualifying, categorizing, and
ranking. Biopolitics in Foucault, as Larry Reynolds (2005) notes, actually means
bio-administration. Foucault thus diagnoses a specifically technocratic under-
standing of politics in modernity: politics is mainly the set of technologies
required to achieve certain ends such as the increase of the welfare and produc-
tivity of the population and the relative strength of the state as compared to other
states.
Arendt (1958), too, views modern politics mainly as administrating or manag-
ing the necessities of life. The 19th and 20th centuries, according to her, have
developed an understanding of politics that equates politics with government
and sees it as a sort of housekeeping. Whereas, however, Foucault takes a non-
normative view, simply stating the substitution of one unappealing understand-
ing of politics for another, Arendt takes a decisively normative perspective,
mourning the loss of the public sphere and referring to an emphatic idea of 
politics as an activity that forms an end in itself.
Again, we find that a general feature of modernity culminates in totalitarian-
ism. Under totalitarian rule, there is no room for politics in the sense of express-
ing and debating different viewpoints and opinions and for acting in concert as
opposed to exercising command and obedience. In short, there is no space for
political action as an end in itself. The sites where the utmost destruction of the
ability for political action altogether took place were the camps (Arendt, 1996).
Hence, we find that both Arendt and Foucault see totalitarianism as the extreme
case of a system that has turned politics into a knowledge-based administration
of life.
In totalitarianism, according to Arendt (1968), this knowledge-based admin-
istration of life takes on a new dimension: she depicts the system of the 
camps in terms of ‘experiments’ and ‘laboratories’, that is, in terms of techno-
scientific knowledge production. Totalitarianism, here, is seen as a gigantic
experiment on human subjects, the camps being the laboratories where new
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technologies of turning humans into mere life are developed and tested: ‘The
concentration and extermination camps of totalitarian regimes serve as the 
laboratories in which the fundamental belief of totalitarianism that everything is
possible is being verified’ (p. 437). The last observation about the relation
between modernity and totalitarianism in Foucault and Arendt concerns the
processual structure of time. It is here that Arendt can offer some crucial insights
into the nature of totalitarianism and the modern link between politics and life.
Therefore, in the following, I will reconstruct her argumentation in more detail.
Again, Foucault makes us aware of a specifically new modern feature of
power and politics which, as Arendt’s analysis makes clear, fully and fatally
takes shape in totalitarianism. He points out that the new modern form of power
which refers to ‘man-as-a-living-being’ (Foucault, 2003: 242) does not really
target individuals as living beings. It does not primarily operate through 
exercising direct control over the body or through intervening in individual
lives. Instead, it targets collective phenomena such as the birth rate, or the 
average life expectancy. While on the individual level these phenomena seem
ungovernable, they are not necessarily so when taken as collective phenomena.
This, however, implies another characteristic new feature of biopolitics, namely
that it targets processes, temporal phenomena, phenomena which ‘occur over a
period of time, which have to be studied over a certain period of time: they are
serial phenomena. The phenomena addressed by biopolitics are, essentially,
aleatory events that occur within a population that exists over a period of time’
(p. 246, emphases added).
Biopolitics is essentially about ‘taking control of life and the biological
processes of man-as-species’ (Foucault, 2003: 247, emphasis added); it ‘is a
technology in which bodies are replaced by general biological processes’ 
(p. 249). In other words, the processes Foucault is talking about do not take
place within an individual’s life time. On the contrary, they pass through indi-
vidual life. The individual’s birth and death do not delimitate but on the contrary
mediate and facilitate the activities of modern governing. Hence, the life that
biopolitics targets has a supra-individual dimension, not just in a numeric but
also in a temporal sense (Gerodetti, 2005). Modern politics, as Foucault depicts
it, consists of a set of government technologies which act upon a target, the 
biological processes in the population, within which individual life is just a 
transitory moment.
We will rediscover this relation between politics and life and its specific 
temporal structure in a radicalized form in Arendt’s analysis of totalitarianism.
To her, it forms a key to understanding the specific nature of totalitarianism.
Understanding, here, means to recognize the principle that sets this form of
government in motion (Arendt, 2005). However, it is also more: ‘Insofar as
totalitarian movements have sprung up in the non-totalitarian world (crystalliz-
ing elements found in that world, since totalitarian governments have not been
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imported from the moon), the process of understanding is clearly, and perhaps
primarily, also a process of self-understanding’ (p. 310).
Trying to understand totalitarianism, for her, includes asking the question of
how it could have an ‘appeal’ to people and she examines this question both in
her works on totalitarianism and in The Human Condition (1958). However, she
does so not on a political sociology plane but on a speculative, if not theological,
plane, seeking to understand the rule of processual temporality as an answer to
the questions of death, finitude, and loneliness. It is at this point that Arendt and
Foucault definitely part; Foucault would not concede that it made sense to deal
with questions of that kind. He deliberately restricts himself to the study of when
and how certain questions emerged and evolved. However, such self-restriction
comes at a cost: within these limits it is neither possible to ask the question of
‘appeal’, which certainly limits the range of understanding what was going on,
nor is it possible to develop better, non-destructive answers or to distinguish
between bad, worse, and better answers at all. Therefore I think it is worthwhile
to take a closer look at Arendt’s analysis of the configuration of politics, life, and
temporality that characterizes the nature of totalitarianism and links it to the
modern predicament. Against this backdrop we can then reconstruct Arendt’s
concept of natality as a guidepost to break away from this still dangerous 
configuration.
At the core of totalitarianism, both as a form of government and as a type of
ideology, Arendt argues, lies the idea that all human action is subordinated 
to laws of nature or laws of history.3 In retrospect, one such line leads from
Darwin to Nazi racism, another from Marx to Stalinism. What both have in
common is the idea ‘that a superior process of movement has seized both nature
and history’ (Arendt, 1996: 952).4 Totalitarianism, according to Arendt, is 
largely about executing the laws of nature or history. What does this mean? It
essentially implies a disastrously distorted, preposterous relation between conti-
nuity and change, intransience and transience, timelessness and time. Here,
Arendt in fact starts from some basic assumptions about human needs, and about
the kind of relation between intransience and transience that would be more
appropriate to humans. Her assumption is that, due to their capacity for freedom
and spontaneity, human actions and their results unavoidably have a moment of
unpredictability, instability, and transience to them. That is, transience is built
into the human condition – which is a problem men inevitably have to deal with.
Positive law and political institutions, to Arendt, form something like an appro-
priate compensatory answer to this problem. They are able to provide continuity
and stability in order to balance the essential instability and changeability of
human action. Positive laws are depicted in terms of ‘boundaries’ (Arendt, 2005:
341–2) or a ‘framework of stability’ (p. 341), which confines but also permits
and protects the exercise of freedom. As such, positive law hedges what she
calls a ‘common world, the reality of some transcending continuity’ (p. 342).
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Two other salient concepts in this context are ‘home’ and ‘homelessness’.
Arendt (1968) goes so far as to assume that ‘human beings need the constant
transformation of chaotic and accidental conditions into a man-made pattern of
relative consistency’ (p. 352). The transformation of class society into mass
society and the related process of atomization, in her view, have eroded such a
common world and left the masses in a condition of ‘essential homelessness’ 
(p. 352). She even speaks of a ‘social and spiritual homelessness’ (p. 352,
emphasis added), which underlines that she is arguing on a highly speculative
plane here.
The totalitarian response to this ‘spiritual homelessness’ was to twist around
the relation between continuity and change so that under totalitarian rule it is
human action which is made ‘static’ (Arendt, 2005: 342), whereas all laws are
turned into ‘laws of movement’. Terror, the main instrument of totalitarian rule,
‘stabilizes’ or ‘freezes’ men (p. 342) through shutting down the spaces where
freedom and spontaneity could be exercised, whereas the laws of nature or
history undermine and ultimately destroy the conditions of stability and a
‘common world’. At first glance, the laws of nature or history, in contrast to 
positive, man-made law, seem to be characterized by their unchanging, perma-
nent quality, their ‘timeless presence’, as Arendt puts it. At the same time, 
however, the idea of laws of nature or history display an inherent dynamic
linked to the political zoefication of humans. We can reconstruct Arendt’s argu-
ment through discerning three ways in which the laws of nature or history form
laws of movement: first, they allegedly determine the course and movement of
history, much as natural laws determine the course of the planets. Second, totali-
tarian movements make them their highest ranking source of authority, so they
become the laws of these movements. Third, the totalitarian movement as such
can only proceed if it avoids the establishment of any stable institutional order.
In order to maintain its existence, it has to preserve its form as a political 
movement even after having taken seizure of the state. Arendt (1968) insists that
totalitarianism is far from forming a monolithic or hierarchical state structure
but is rather characterized by its ‘shapelessness’ (p. 395). Through mechanisms
such as the confusing co-existence of party and state offices, real and façade
power centres, overlapping and competing jurisdictions, and not least the con-
stant shifting of the centre of power, it avoids the establishment of stability.
Keep in mind, Arendt insists, that the goal of a totalitarian movement is not
simply to retain power within the territorial boundaries of a state but to conquer
the world and to create a new mankind. The latter in particular can be seen as a
dynamic goal. Whereas world conquest could theoretically be achieved – the
surface of the earth is limited – this is not the case with creating the master race
or the ‘new man’; these are endless projects requiring an ever ongoing process
of purge and elimination. It is here that the different dimensions of the ‘laws 
of movement’ converge with one another and with the political zoefication of
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humans: the project of creating the new human species through the execution of
supra-human laws of movement, thereby avoiding stabilization and preserving
the political movement as such, according to Arendt, forms the essence of 
totalitarianism.
Creating the new mankind, or the new human race or species, through exe-
cuting the laws of nature or history displays and implies the general features 
that Foucault ascribes to biopolitics: it targets collective and serial, temporal
phenomena. Put differently, it operates on the level of the species and employs
the sequence of generations, thereby transgressing, utilizing, and mobilizing
individual life. Further, when Foucault (2003) highlights evolutionism as a 
general paradigm that emerged in the 19th century he comes very close to
Arendt’s analysis of processual thought:
Basically, evolutionism, understood in the broad sense – or in other words, not so
much Darwin’s theory itself as a set, a bundle, of notions (such as: the hierarchy of
species that grow from a common evolutionary tree, the struggle for existence
among species, the selection that eliminates the less fit) – naturally became within
a few years during the nineteenth century not simply a way of transcribing a 
political discourse into biological terms, and not simply a way of dressing up a
political discourse in scientific clothing, but a real way of thinking about the 
relations between colonization, the necessity for wars, criminality, the phenomena
of madness and mental illness, the history of societies with their different classes,
and so on. (p. 257)
Evolutionism, according to Foucault, forms an important link between classical
biopolitics and what he calls the evolutionary racism developed by Stalinism
and Nazism. Thus, Foucault, too, points at the specifically processual structure
of modern temporality, which links the biopolitical dimension of the modern
project to the totalitarian project.5 Totalitarianism prolongs and radicalizes the
features of biopolitics highlighted in Foucault to the point that it uses the elimi-
nation of humans as a means of productively consuming individual life in the
production process of the new species life. The only functions individuals can
have vis-à-vis the laws of movement are to execute them and/or to become
‘walking embodiments of these laws’ (Arendt, 2005: 340), which is by no means
mutually exclusive. Executing them means actively applying the standards
according to which certain individuals or groups do or do not allow for the
unfolding dynamic of the laws of movements. Embodying them means being
classified according to these standards. Laws or processes which function
through transgressing and productively consuming individual lives are not
served through compliance but through providing the material in which they
realize themselves. This material can be of higher or lower quality and the politi-
cal zoefication of humans is the outcome of a mechanism that judges the exis-
tence of individuals or groups according to the question of whether they present
suitable or unsuitable material to realize and promote the project of enhancing
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the human race. Within this logic, being deemed a ‘dying’ or a ‘decadent class’
functions much the same way as being deemed ‘unfit to live’, whether the 
classification refers to physical qualities or not.
Compared with 19th-century processual thought, the totalitarianism as 
depicted in Arendt thus adds, or at least dramatically increases, the element of
acceleration. The totalitarian project is not only about scientifically understand-
ing the laws of movement but about actively promoting the process of their
unfolding. Here, execution is at the same time acceleration. Its instrument is 
terror, which makes terror the borderline case of a technocratic, instrumentalist
understanding of politics. Hence, Arendt seems to say, processual thought had a
certain appeal to the masses in their ‘spiritual homelessness’ because it enabled
them to participate in a permanent, intransient, ‘timeless presence’. The alleged
intransience or permanence of these laws, however, was a fatal error because in
fact their operating principle was mobilization, dynamization, acceleration.
What processual temporality really did was destroy the chance of establishing
some sort of this-worldly stability, continuity, or common home. In the end, the
supra-gigantic forces whose movements race through humanity, dragging every
individual willy-nilly with them – either riding atop their triumphant car or
crushed under its wheels – may be various and complicated: still, it is surprising to
see how, for all practical political purposes, these ideologies always result in the
same ‘law’ of elimination of individuals for the sake of the process or progress of
the species. From the elimination of harmful or superfluous individuals, the result
of natural or historical movement rises like the phoenix from its own ashes; but
unlike the fabulous bird, this mankind which is the end and at the same time the
embodiment of the movement of either History or Nature requires permanent 
sacrifices, the permanent elimination of hostile or parasitic or unhealthy classes or
races in order to enter upon its bloody eternity. (Arendt, 2005: 341)
The kind of eternity the totalitarian movement has to offer is a deadly eternity,
the permanence it produces is the ‘tranquility of the cemetery’ (Arendt, 2005:
348). Hence, the totalitarian project is based on a specifically processual struc-
ture of temporality in which ‘endlessness’ has taken a deadly double meaning:
first, the processes determined by the laws of nature or history and executed
through terror cannot come to an end because their goal, the production of a new
human species, can never be completed. Second, each individual and each
human activity merely counts as a means to promote the process and not as an
end in itself. These processes have a direction, but no end(s). To Arendt (1968),
this structure is expressed concisely by the maxim of the SS: ‘No task exists for
its own sake’ (p. 409). This attitude, she says, destroys ‘all genuine interest in
specific jobs and produces a mentality which sees every conceivable action as an
instrument for something entirely different’ (p. 409).
Here, however, we also see that processual temporality is not confined to the
totalitarian project, although it is within the totalitarian project that it assumes its
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most deadly power. Rather, the relation cited earlier between actions and ends
bears considerable resemblance to Marx’s analysis of the relation between
exchange value and utility value under capitalist conditions, in which human
productivity is essentially transformed into a mere means to advance the process
of accumulation. Indeed, Arendt’s later work on modern society can, arguably,
be read as a study on the functioning of processual temporality before and after
totalitarianism. In The Human Condition (1958), as I will point out in the
following, Arendt both makes an endeavour to understand the development of
processual temporality and to present an alternative model, the temporality of
the interval, the former crystallizing in the priority of life, the latter in the 
concept of natality.
In The Human Condition, Arendt (1958) explores the rise of ‘life’ to be the
supreme good in occidental6 culture; she shows how the changing notion of
‘life’ is related to a pertinent transformation of temporality and how these 
transformations form responses to certain fundamental, traumatic historic 
experiences. The polis, in her view, had offered its citizens a kind of ‘worldly
immortality’ in that it formed the institutional framework for the possibility of
remembrance (p. 314). Life was conceived of as a life story that can be passed
down over generations and remembrance constitutes a response to human 
mortality. This response required a body politic though with a functioning con-
text of narration and remembrance. The decline of the polis therefore meant a
traumatic experience and the cultural response to that experience was the ‘inven-
tion’ of a new form of temporality, namely eternity, which came with a revalua-
tion of the vita contemplativa in relation to political action. This shift, however,
came at the price of devaluating the only human capacity that is able to create a
common world before death.
Similarly, Arendt (1958) understands Christianity and its idea of the immor-
tal soul as a response to the decline of the Roman Empire. However, this shift
meant a further devaluation of political action and the political realm insofar as
the immortality of the soul did not rely on a functioning body politic. On the
contrary, in order to save one’s soul and attain immortality, what mattered was
to turn away from worldly political life. For this reason, Arendt argues, the price
for this new form of immortality was alienation from the interpersonal world.
The beginning of the modern age and the development of modern science
mark a further upheaval in that science implied a model of investigation that
devalued contemplation as a path to truth so that contemplation lost the status of
being the most highly regarded form of life. For a short time, Arendt (1958)
says, work took the place of contemplation and homo faber the place of the
philosopher. However, to the extent that religion lost its capacity to determine
the appropriate ends of work it lost its significance and was superseded by
processual thought, be it evolutionism, historical materialism, life philosophy,
or the belief in progress, as a new notion of temporality. This notion of tempo-
16 TIME & SOCIETY 16(1)
rality in turn, she argues, is modelled on the biological life process, or on a 
biologistical understanding of life. In terms of bios and zoe, it would be 
modelled on zoe, referring to the idea of an entity that, in analogy to the species,
sustains itself through the coming and going of individuals. The species in 
that sense is beyond life and death and so is the assumed entity that underlies
processual thought, be it termed nature, history, society, or progress.
However, we could also say that Arendt understands processual thought as a
response to the ‘spiritual homelessness’ that has accompanied the inhabitants of
the western world from the turn to metaphysics in ancient Greece to post-war
capitalism. To model thought on the life process – zoe – therefore means a
specifically immanentist endeavour of constructing immortality. Note, however,
that Arendt does not consider the quest for immortality to be an essential feature
of ‘human nature’. In her interpretation, the quest for immortality is not a cause
but rather an outcome of or a response to another human need, which she does
assume to be essential: the need to find a home in the world, to be respected as a
member of this worldly community.
Incidentally, according to Arendt, the capitalist economy of the 20th century
is in no way based on work but on labour in that every human activity is directed
at the maintainance of the economic dynamic. Again, we find, ‘no task exists 
for its own sake’; no activity forms an end in itself, any thing and any activity
merely serves to feed the automatically proceeding dynamic. From this perspec-
tive, we still live under the rule of processual temporality. It certainly does not
take as murderous a shape as it has taken in Nazism and Stalinism insofar as it is
not directed at the production of one new single mankind and does not use terror
as its main instrument. However, to the extent that human activities are qualified
and treated as mere means to feed an automatic, relentlessly proceeding para-
mount process, whether it is named progress or globalization, we are still under
the spell of processual thought. In post-war society, Arendt (1970) says, one
form the rule of supra-human processes takes is the inexorable progress of
science and technology ‘compelling us to do whatever we can, regardless of
consequences’ (p. 86), not least in the realm of biotechnology which, in
Arendt’s (1958) view, is apparently driven by the desire to escape the human
condition of natality and mortality.
Hence, we note that Arendt and Foucault help us discern certain critical, inter-
related elements of the modern project that fatally culminated and converged in
the totalitarian projects of the 20th century but did not disappear with them. As
such features we have identified the political zoefication of humans, a techno-
cratic understanding of politics, and processual temporality. Biopolitics can be
understood as the combination of these elements. As long as these elements are
to be found in contemporary thought, science, technology, society, or politics, it
is advisable to watch out for their impact and their possible convergence.
Arendt, in my view, goes a little further than Foucault in that she decidedly 
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outlines an alternative, non-biopolitical understanding of politics, life and 
temporality captured by the concept of natality. The idea of natality is meant to
present a different and better response to the existential human need to find a
home in the world. This response would differ from the various predominant
responses we can find in occidental history which all focused on overcoming
mortality. Up to now, the history of occidental thought has been preoccupied by
mortality (Arendt, 1958). Metaphysics, Christianity, and processual thought, in
this perspective, do respond to the need of finding a home in the world and to 
the experience of this need being frustrated. Metaphysics and Christianity
responded in developing a specific temporal form: eternity, a sphere of perma-
nence and intransience beyond the interpersonal world and superior to it. In
processual thought, however, eternity moves from transcendence into the imma-
nence of nature or history and in this move gets dynamized so that what remains
from eternity is just the constancy of the process. Processuality is the new 
temporal form emerging in the 19th century. Hence, to Arendt, both eternity and
processuality form temporal structures that respond to the problem of homeless-
ness in the world, a problem caused by the nature of human action itself, but they
respond in a way which rather makes things worse as they devaluate and under-
mine those human faculties through which humans are able to create a home in
this world. To focus on natality instead of mortality would mean to acknowledge
that the only remedy to the volatility of human action and its results is human
action itself, complemented by the capacity to promise and to forgive (Arendt,
1958). While human action produces results that are volatile and unstable, action
is also the capacity to begin anew, to create a new political community in 
concert with others. Arendt (1968) concludes Origins with the warning that
totalitarianism will stay with us as an ever-present potentiality but also with the
more optimistic outlook that the end of totalitarianism at the same time implies
the promise of a new beginning: ‘Beginning, before it becomes a historical
event, is the supreme capacity of man, politically, it is identical with man’s 
freedom’ (p. 479).
Although the concept of beginning, initium, is taken from Augustine, Arendt
(1968) gives it a distinctive turn in linking it to the factum of birth: ‘This begin-
ning is guaranteed by each new birth; it is indeed every man’ (p. 479). In The
Human Condition (1958) she develops this idea further, capturing the relation
between beginning, freedom, action and birth with the term ‘natality’. Being
born, here, is not only a physiological process, the beginning of biological life,
although it is that too, but in the case of humans it also means entering the world
which is already inhabited by others – zur Welt kommen, in German – and the
beginning of a being capable of acting, that is, of beginning herself. Action can
be understood as a kind of second birth, in that the acting person once again, and
this time on her own account, enters the world, that is, the interactions and
common projects of persons (p. 176). Unlike many other metaphors of a second
18 TIME & SOCIETY 16(1)
birth this one does not devaluate the ‘first birth’. The second birth is not the
antithesis of the first but its confirmation; it means accepting the gift of spon-
taneity and freedom man has received already at and through birth. While birth
forms the beginning of physiological life that has to be sustained through labour
and work, action is the essence of political life. Physiological life thus provides
time for the good life; action fills zoe with bios. It is important to note though
that political life, in Arendt, is no idyll, no paradise that had been lost and could
be regained; the idea of embracing natality is not meant to lead us back to an
alleged state of static timelessness. There is no denying that human action can
cause mistakes and that political institutions are volatile, which is why we need
promising and forgiving.
With the help of forgiveness one can not undo mistakes caused by human
action but one can prevent them from determining the future. By means of 
making and keeping promises human beings can bring consistency and commit-
ment into their affairs without relinquishing their freedom. Focusing on natality,
instead of mortality, means appreciating these human capacities and sustaining
the institutional framework that allows them to be exercised. To focus on 
natality also means to break away from eternity and processuality and to intro-
duce a new temporal form instead: the interval. Thus it is not least a revision of
our understanding of time that the concept of natality is aiming at, as Julia
Kristeva (2001) has remarked.7 Human life, then, is not understood as a transi-
tory stage to eternity or as a means to feed the dynamic of an ongoing process
nor as a timeless idyll but as ‘the time interval between birth and death’ (Arendt,
1958: 97). As such it has a beginning and an end, it is limited, and it provides
time for the good life, which in turn can be remembered as a life story.
To focus on natality would thus mean putting an end to processual tempo-
rality and replacing it with the time of the interval. It is here where we can locate
what Susannah Young-ah Gottlieb (2003) has called Arendt’s ‘weak’ or ‘incon-
spicuous messianism’ (p. 160). Arendt (1958) frequently refers to the figure of
Jesus, particularly when she wants to emphasize the significance of action and
forgiveness. Jesus, Arendt holds, was far from preaching the superiority of con-
templation over action: ‘The only activity Jesus of Nazareth recommends in his
preachings is action, and the only human capacity he stresses is the capacity “to
perform miracles”’ (p. 318). Hence, it is not necessarily Jesus who has 
messianic qualities but rather Jesus demonstrates the messianic, potentially
redeeming powers of action and forgiveness. To Arendt, these amount to the
human faculty to perform miracles. In many passages of the New Testament, she
tells us, ‘miracles are clearly not supernatural events but only what all miracles,
those performed by men no less than those performed by a divine agent, always
must be, namely, interruptions of some natural series of events, of some auto-
matic process, in whose context they constitute the wholly unexpected’ (Arendt,
1968/1993: 168). This miraculous power of human action has a messianic 
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quality to it as it ends one time and opens up another; it disrupts the time of the
process and opens up the time of the interval. It brings the current time to a close
insofar as it stops time’s race towards the future and breaks open a time span in
the present, a time between limits.8
The element of messianism and the thought of redemption are alien to
Foucault and it is with regard to this messianic perspective that Arendt’s and
Foucault’s conceptions of temporality fundamentally diverge. Foucault’s con-
siderations about time (see Michon, 2002) do not refer to the messianic idea of
an end of time, whereas Arendt’s conception of human action as a messianic
power that manifests itself in the public sphere bears strong affinities to what
Gershom Scholem (1971) identifies as the messianic idea in Judaism: ‘Judaism,
in all of its forms and manifestations, has always maintained a concept of
redemption as an event which takes place publicly, on the stage of history and
within the community. It is an occurence which takes place in the visible world
and which cannot be conceived apart from such a visible appearance’ (p. 1).
Arendt, as well as Foucault, strictly rejects the ‘strong’ messianic idea that the
world could be saved once and for all, which she, as well as Foucault, considers
extremely dangerous. Nevertheless, she does convey a messianic message, only
that the messianic powers, the human faculties of action and forgiving, are them-
selves temporal; they operate within time, their results are unstable and all they
can do is open up time for a new beginning in this world. Hence, messianic time
in Arendt has the structure of the interval, redemption means freedom, the 
exercise of which in Arendt is synonymous with power, and such power takes
place, quite as Scholem (1971) put it, publicly, in the community.
To Foucault, in contrast, freedom means the capacity to think differently and
to conceive of ourselves differently, different from the requirements of subjecti-
fication, of becoming an ‘autonomous’ subject through confessing and truth
telling and thereby producing knowledge required for the biopolitical manage-
ment of the living. The liberty Foucault (1997) finally leaves us with consists of
thought practices and self-practices; liberty to Foucault is ‘an attitude, an ethos,
a philosophical life’ (p. 319), ‘a permanent critique of our historical era’ 
(p. 312), a ‘critical ontology of ourselves’, it is ‘work carried out by ourselves
upon ourselves’ (p. 316). It is a liberty that remains preoccupied with the self, if
not confined within the limits of the vita contemplativa. Foucault’s way of inter-
rogating history and exposing allegedly universal, necessary, rational or eman-
cipatory features of modernity as being not only historical but also inherently
ambiguous provides us with a tremendously helpful prerequisite to analyse the
logic of modern biopolitics. It is hard to see, however, how this self-centred,
philosophical conception of liberty could point at an alternative conception of
politics, one that enables us not only to analyse but also to overcome biopolitics.
The concept of natality, I have argued, takes us a step further, offering an
alternative understanding of politics, life, and temporality. Human life here is
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understood not as a moment in an endlessly racing process whose laws are to be
executed on the individual, nor as a manageable entity but as the time span
between birth and death. Time is not the medium for the execution of supra-
human processes but the interval that provides the chance to perform activities
for their own sake. Politics, finally, would be understood not as the management
of populations or the acceleration of economic or scientific progress but as 
acting in concert together with others, and the purpose of politics would not be
to enhance the quality of some collective entity, to create a better species or to
maintain the dynamics of the economy, but to make the world a home.
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1. Agamben (1998) has pointed out that the Greeks had no single word for ‘life’ but the
two terms ‘bios’ and ‘zoe’. Unlike the contemporary use of the prefix ‘bio’ in terms
such as ‘biology’ or ‘biopolitics’, ‘bios’ denoted the life one was living whereas ‘zoe’
comprised the physical aspects of being an animal, a living thing.
2. Here, as in many instances, the German version of Origins which has not so much
been translated but rather rewritten by Arendt herself, is much sharper and stronger
compared to the earlier English version. Whenever I refer to the German version, it is
for this reason.
3. A comprehensive study on the historical development of what Arendt calls processual
thought, namely the idea of progress and its relation to the notion of one single
mankind as the subject of improvement, can be found in André Taguieff (2001).
Taguieff’s study basically confirms Arendt’s thesis that processual thought forms one
of the problematic continuities between the core features of modernity and totalitari-
anism.
4. Cited and translated from the German version. In the English version, Arendt (1968)
simply states that in Marx and Darwin the law has changed its meaning from express-
ing a ‘framework of stability’ to expressing ‘the motion itself’ (p. 464).
5. For a comprehensive overview on the respective notions of temporality in the differ-
ent stages of the work of Foucault see Michon (2002).
6. Arendt’s account is partly paralleled by Ivan Illich (1992), who also presents a history
of ‘life’, but stresses even more the cultural construction of this notion. According to
Illich, in the 1970s and 80s, ‘life’ became a new fetish. It appears as ‘a life’, a precious
substance which has to be preserved and managed by institutions, experts and profes-
sionals. Similar to Arendt, whom he does not explicitly refer to, he holds that the 
construct of ‘life’ is filling a void created by modern scientific society. However, he
22 TIME & SOCIETY 16(1)
does not deal with what makes Arendt’s story on the rise of ‘life’ so troubling: the con-
nection to totalitarianism.
7. However, I do not share Kristeva’s (2001) view that Arendt pursues a vehement
defence of life in The Human Condition. Kristeva does not sort out the different mean-
ings of the term ‘life’ in this book.
8. Arendt’s critique of the idea of progress and processual thought clearly draws from
Walter Benjamin’s ‘Theses on the Concept of History’ (1968). The affinities and 
differences between Arendt’s and Benjamin’s conception of temporality would, how-
ever, require another study. References
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